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Indigenous Law in North America in the 
Wake of Conquestt 
james W. Zion* & Robert Yazzie** 
INTRODUCTION 
To what extent do the indigenous peoples of the Americas1 still use 
their own law? What is their right, privilege or freedom to have their 
own laws and procedures to resolve disputes? What is the practice of 
North American states in dealing with indigenous laws? What is indige-
nous or traditional law? 
"Traditional Indian law" is a popular contemporary topic. In North 
America, there are numerous conferences on the subject,2 and the 
American alternative dispute resolution (A.D.R.) movement recog-
nizes the uniqueness of Indian dispute resolution.3 Indian nation jus-
tice leaders insist that traditional justice is not "alternative dispute 
t This article was originally prepared for the technical seminar Prevencion de Conflictos y 
Solucion en Comunidades Indigenas, at the Inter-American Bar Foundation Conference, 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, (Mar. 21-23, 1995). 
*James W. Zion, Solicitor to the Courts of the Navajo Nation; J.D., Columbus School of Law, 
Catholic University of America, 1969; B.A., University of Saint Thomas, 1966. 
**The Honorable Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation; J.D., University of New 
Mexico, 1982; B.A., Oberlin College, 1973. 
1 This is the term currently in vogue in international practice to refer to the original inhabitants 
of North America, among others. The terms "native" and "aboriginal" also apply, with various 
connotations. We are aware that the term "Indian" is a pejorative in many parts of Latin America. 
While "Native American" is often used in the United States of America, many people refer to 
themselves first by their tribal name (e.g., "Navajo") and then by the generic term "Indian." That 
term will be used to refer to the original peoples of the Americas. 
2 E.g., Traditional Indian Law, Federal Bar Association, 20th Annual Indian Law Conference, 
Albuquerque, N.M. (Apr. 6-7, 1995); Alternative Justice Dispute Resolution Conference, Native 
Community Law Office Association of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia (Feb. 24-25, 
1995); Tribal Peacemaking Conference, Native American Legal Resource Center, Oklahoma City 
University School of Law, Tulsa, Okla. (May 21-22, 1993). The National Indian Justice Center of 
Petaluma, California, also offers an ongoing course on traditional Indian dispute resolution. 
3 See Diane LeResche, Editw's Notes, in Special Issue: Native American Perspectives on Peacemak-
ing, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1993, at 321, 322-23; The Hon. Robert Yazzie, Traditional Navajo 
Dispute Resolution in the Navajo Peacemaker Court, Fifth Annual Frank E.A. Sander Dispute 
Resolution Lecture, Dispute Resolution Section, American Bar Association (n.d.) (in publica-
tion). 
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resolution," but their original dispute resolution. Indian justice meth-
ods and institutions persist into modern times, and they continue to 
be a viable method of law and justice. They are a legitimate means of 
self-governance and a model for industrial societies which now recog-
nize the shortcomings of state justice systems and methods. 
This article is an overview of traditional Indian law in North Amer-
ica. It will chronicle the continuation of this form oflaw, with particular 
emphasis on Navajo traditional law (called "Navajo common law") as 
an example. Indigenous law exists within state legal systems, so a better 
understanding of its place in contemporary North America requires 
knowledge of the historical development of the international and 
municipal law doctrines of recognition. With the advent of A.D.R. in 
North America, it is important to contrast it with Indian methods. The 
American and Canadian A.D.R. movements incorporate a great deal 
of state system methods and protocols, so it is important to state that 
traditional Indian law is not A.D.R. and that methods of A.D.R. must 
not be forced on Indian nations, as adjudication was. Traditional or 
indigenous law is based on social arrangements which are far different 
from those imported to the Americas from Europe, and the contem-
porary Navajo justice system, and other systems, revive such ancient 
procedures in modern settings. It is important for national policy-mak-
ers to understand the processes and functioning of traditional Indian 
justice methods to effectively deal with indigenous populations. Most 
Indian nations of the Americas refuse to assimilate, and many Indian 
peoples are still largely autonomous. 
This article was prepared for an inter-American conference with 
representatives from Bolivia, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, Co-
lumbia, Brazil and the United States of America.4 The subject is the 
4 One of the principal reasons for the conference was implementation of Article 171 of the 
Bolivian Constitution, amended on August 12, 1994. Letter from Andres Barreto, Esq., Inter-
American Bar Foundation, to James W. Zion (Dec. 29, 1994) (on file with authors). Article 171 
provides: 
The social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous peoples [of Bolivia] are rec-
ognized, respected and protected in the standard of the law, especially those relative to 
communal lands of origin, guaranteeing the use and supporting the sustainable utiliza-
tion [of] natural resources, their identity, values, languages, customs and institutions. 
The State recognizes the juridical personality of indigenous and rural communities 
and of rural associations and syndicates. 
The natural authorities of indigenous and rural communities may exercise the func-
tions of administering and applying their own rules as an alternative solution to conflicts, 
in accordance with their customs and procedures, [provided that] they are not contrary 
to this Constitution and the laws. The Law [will homologate] these functions ... with 
the prerogatives of the Powers of State. 
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relationship of indigenous legal systems with the state systems of those 
nations, and how Indian justice works. American states continue to 
frame Indian affairs policies to deal with distinct Indian populations. 
As was noted at the end of the period of colonialism in 1945, forcing 
national laws on indigenous peoples works only "when someone is 
checking up. "5 The failure to address the grievances of indigenous 
peoples causes rebellion and resistance, given their continued distinct-
ness in American societies. Indigenous peoples view impositions by 
states as political oppression or tyranny, and that is the result of failing 
to respect Indian ways.6 This study is an exercise in practical policy 
analysis to show that honoring the laws of Indians is in the interests of 
contemporary governments of the Americas. 
Part I of this study will discuss the development of the right of 
Indians to be governed by their own law. It will look at the development 
of various legal theories in Western thought, and their impact on the 
development of the Spanish, British, American and international rules 
of recognition of Indian law. Part II will address the myth that the 
Indians "have no law." Part III will discuss the A.D.R. movement and 
its application to Indian law. Part IV gives an overview of the traditional 
Indian legal system, particularly as it compares to American and Euro-
pean legal systems. Part V sets forth Navajo justice concepts and the 
process of Navajo dispute resolution. This article concludes, in Part VI, 
that Indian dispute resolution, far from being an "alternative" method 
of dispute resolution, is one from which European and American 
justice systems can learn, and one that is deserving of respect. 
CoNSTITUCION [Constitution of Aug. 12, 1994] art. 171 (Bol.) [hereinafter BoL. CoNST.], reprinted 
in 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WoRLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1994). 
5 Felix Keesing, Applied Anthropology in Colonial Administration, in THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE 
WORLD CRISIS 373, 394 (Ralph Linton ed., 1945). 
!d. 
[S]tudies of cultural processes would seem to indicate that only as change is self-moti-
vated is it really effective. Groups and individuals cannot be compelled by law or by force 
to modify their customary ways of life and thought. Conversely, they cannot be held 
back when they want to change. At most, attempts to direct behavior in these arbitrary 
ways will produce overt conformity to the demanded forms of conduct-when someone 
is checking up. 
6 "Political oppression is easier when there is a racial or cultural distinction between the masters 
and the oppressed. Tyranny will be harsher in a state established through conquest of one people 
by another than in a state where all share the same language, culture, and history." ELI SAGAN, 
AT THE DAWN OF TYRANNY: THE ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUALISM, POLITICAL OPPRESSION AND THE 
STATE 278 (1985). 
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I. THE RIGHT OF INDIANS TO ENJOY THEIR OWN LAW 
The concept that distinct peoples should be governed by their own 
law is ancient and fundamental to Western thought. It begins with 
Roman law, which had a "practice of leaving conquered peoples to 
abide by their own laws. "7 
It was a general principle which marked the early Roman 
policy in Italy to allow a subject community to retain its own 
municipal laws, and to administer justice between its own 
citizens, so far as this was consistent with a state of subjection 
to Rome. The citizens of such a state would thus have legal 
rights with reference to each other.8 
Even Jesus was tried by the "chief priests and elders" before he was 
taken before Pilate for a Roman trial, and although Pilate "washed his 
hands" of the affair, he ordered execution under local law, saying, "see 
ye to it. "9 Roman law affected European legal traditions via canon law, 10 
and Roman law produced "the most lasting influences on Spanish 
culture. "11 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 12 squarely faced the issues which 
would later be the focus of heated international debates when Spain 
entered the Americas-issues which are still pertinent today: whether 
all humans are competent to make law; whether "gentiles"13 possess 
reason to make law; whether "sinners" can make law; whether the 
"custom of the country" is law; and who is bound by the law of different 
kingdoms. Aquinas answered that law is a rule of human reason which 
can be made by "the whole people, or someone who is the vicegerent 
of the whole people."14 Gentiles possess natural law, and even rulers in 
7 LYLE N. McALISTER, SPAIN & PORTUGAL IN THE NEW WoRLD 1492-1700, at 25 (1984). 
8WILLIAM C. MoREY, OuTLINES OF RoMAN LAw 64 (1900). 
9 Matthew 27:1-26 (King James). 
IO See HAROLD j. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 200, 221-24 (1983). 
II CARLOS FUENTES, THE BURIED MIRROR: REFLECTIONS ON SPAIN AND THE NEW WORLD 35 
(1992). Fuentes elaborates, "Beyond the national stereotypes, then, a number of significant 
factors created a Spanish and Spanish American tradition from the time of Roman domination. 
Nothing reveals the form of the tradition better than the clash with the Other, he or she who is 
not like you or me." !d. This is still the core of Indian-White conflicts in the Americas. !d. 
12 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DIS-
COURSES OF CONQUEST 43 (1990). 
13 Or "heathens," "infidels," "foreigners," "aliens," "non-Christians," "Indians" or others who are 
members of the "Other." See FuENTES, supra note 11, at 35. 
14 See THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAw (SUMMA THEOLOGICA, QUESTIONS 90-97) 2-4 
1997] INDIGENOUS LAW IN NORTH AMI<:RICA 59 
the "fames" of sin (i.e. non-Christians) are capable of making law. 15 
Law adapts to place and time, according to the "customs of the coun-
try. "16 Customs are not only "law," but customary law overcomes positive 
law, because what people do is more important than what they sayY 
Finally, people are subject to their own law, because it derives from 
their own authority as a people. 18 Aquinas was a Dominican, and his 
influence on Spanish law through Dominican priest-lawyers is strong 
and obvious. 
Another important canonist who had a major influence on the 
canon and medieval law doctrines of dealing with "heathen" or 
"infidel" peoples was Pope Innocent IV ( 1243-1265), a canon lawyer 
and contemporary of Aquinas. 19 Innocent IV, in a commentary on an 
earlier papal decretal by Pope Innocent III, the Quod super his, elabo-
rated on the rights of infidel peoples in the Crusades. 20 The essential 
concept that is important for this discussion is that Innocent IV con-
cluded that non-Christians have a right to dominium over their prop-
erty and the right to self-rule, which cannot be taken away unless they 
violate natural law through sexual perversion or idolatry. 21 
Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1485-1546), hailed as the founder of inter-
national law and writer of the first treatise on Indian rights in the 
Americas, was a leading Thomist.22 He gave the first unequivocal de-
fence of the Indians against their conquerors, asserting that Indians 
were "true lords in relation to private and public affairs" and had a 
genuine political society. 23 He refuted the false notion (which was a 
heresy in Catholic theology) that without grace, Indians could have no 
polity and said "there can be no doubt Indians possessed true domin-
("Whether law is something pertaining to reason?"), 7-9 ("Whether the reason of any man is 
competent to make laws?") (1987). 
15 See id. at 14-16 ("Whether there is a natural law?"), 26-29 ('Whether there is a law in the 
fomes of sin?"). Current interest in public scandal by politicians keeps the second question alive. 
16 See id. at 80-83 ("Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?"). 
17 See id. at 110-13 ("Whether custom can obtain force of law?") (emphasis added). 
18 See id. at 98-101 ('Whether all are subject to the law?"). 
19 WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 13, 43. 
20 Id. at 44. 
21 See id. at 13-14, 45-49; Fr. Michael Joseph Stogre, SJ., M.D., The Development of Papal 
Teaching on Aboriginal Rights: 500 Years of Catholic Social Teaching 3-7 (1991) (unpublished 
manuscript, kindly furnished by Fr. Stogre). Violations of natural law in idolatry and sexual 
perversions had political consequences. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
22 See QUENTIN SKINNER, 2 THE FoUNDATIONS OF MODERN PoLITICAL THOUGHT 135-36 (1978); 
Donald juneau, The Light of Dead Stars, 11 AM. INDIAN L.R. 1, ll n.55 (1983). 
23 SKINNER, supra note 22, at 169 (quoting Vitoria's first lecture, The Recently Discovered Indi-
ans). 
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ion both in public and private affairs."24 ''Vitoria simply revert[ed] ... 
to the pivotal Thomist claim that there is an equal capacity in all men, 
whether or not they are Christian, to establish their own political 
societies. "25 
Another Dominican, Bartolome de las Casas (1474-1566), took Vi-
toria's academic discourse into Spanish royal venues and used it on 
behalf of Indians.26 While his work built on Aquinas' doctrines, Las 
Casas argued using Spanish and medieval law rather than basing his 
positions solely on theology or canon lawY He established the doctrine 
that Indians are "human," and thus possess reason, and that they have 
their own law and government (and a right to them) which was to be 
respected by the Spanish Crown. 
One of the fora Las Casas used was the papacy. At the time, the 
Vatican still held some international authority, both spiritual and secu-
lar. When Columbus returned from his first voyage to announce what 
he had found, Spain commenced an international arbitration before 
the Spanish Pope, Alexander VJ.28 While the Pope "donated" most of 
the New World to Spain,29 the Church was more concerned with the 
good treatment of the native peoples of the newly-discovered lands, 
and bestowed a trust upon the Spanish monarchs to see to their 
well-being. Las Casas took the political debate over the rights oflndians 
to Pope Paul III who issued the bull Sublimis Deus in 1537.30 
The bull responded to contemporary debates in Spain. Were Indians 
"humans" or were they the subjects of "natural slavery," as found in 
Aristotle's works? Did Indians have rights to liberty or to property? The 
bull resoundingly reaffirmed the humanity and reason of Indians and 
concluded "that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy 
24 !d. 
25 !d. 
26 See id. at 170. His most famous works appear in English. See, e.g., BARTOLOME DE LAs CAsAs, 
lN DEFENSE OF THE INDIANS (Stafford Poole ed., 1992) (Spain, n.d.); BARTOLOME DE LAS CASAS, 
A SHORT AccOUNT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIES (Stafford Poole ed., 1992) (Spain, 1552). 
27 See Kenneth Pennington, Bartolome de Las Casas and the Tradition of Medieval Law, in 39 
CHURCH HISTORY 143, 149 (1970). 
28 James Muldoon, Papal Responsibility for the Infidel: Another Look at Alexander VI's Inter 
Caetera, 64 CATHOLIC HrsT. REv. 168, 170 (1978); Stogre, supra note 21, at 14-20. 
29 Juneau, supra note 22, at 11. Both Muldoon and Stogre question the "donation" issue, as did 
Vitoria in his lectures. See Muldoon, supra note 28, at 170; Stogre, supra note 21, at 14-20. 
30 See Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 
GEO. LJ. 1, ll-12 (1942); Alberto de La Hera, El Derecho de Los Indios a La Libertad y a La Fe, 
in 26 ANuARIO DE HrSTORIA DEL DERECHO EsPANOL 87 (lnstituto Nacional de Estudios Juridicos 
ed., 1956); Stogre, supra note 21, at 21-27. 
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their liberty and the possession of their property; nor should they be 
in any way enslaved; should the contrary happen, it shall be null and 
of no effect. "31 
A. The Spanish Rule of Recognition 
The entry of the Spanish and Portuguese into the Americas actually 
marks the division between the Middle Ages or Medieval period and 
the beginning of the Modern period. The situation in the Americas 
was unique. While the Spanish Crown stated its intention to transplant 
old world societies and institutions into the new world, it had to frame 
law and policy to adapt to different geographical and historical circum-
stances.32 Spanish policy developed a law to deal with issues of liberty, 
legal status and the treatment of indigenous or "natural" peoples.33 
What was the legal reality Spain faced when it adjusted medieval 
Castellan law to the necessities of a vast, complex and unknown Ameri-
can reality?34 It was that the Indians whom the settlers35 encountered 
had their own laws and their own government. Shortly before the 
arrival of Cortez in Mexico, Montezuma I codified Aztec law in four-
teen prescriptions, covering everything from criminal to sumptuary, or 
dress code, law.36 The peoples of the Americas already had a well-de-
veloped internationallaw,37 and their own extensive systems oflaw and 
government. 38 
In the face of reality, and given the need to secure voluntary alliance 
with Indians, three schools of thought developed about Indian govern-
31 Cohen, supra note 30, at 12. Cohen asserts that the words of the bull are restated in the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 in its "utmost good faith" towards the Indians. /d. In fact, the bull 
echoes through the centuries in treaties, statutes and documents where one political force or 
people imposes itself on another, and respect for prior law and rights are declared. This is another 
fundamental principle of Western law. 
32CLARENCE H. HARING, THE SPANISH EMPIRE IN AMERICA 109 (1947). 
33 Beatriz Bernal, Derecho Indiano, in DICCIONARIO juRIDICO MEXICANO 994 (lnstituto de 
lnvestigacionesjuridicas ed., 4th ed., 1991). 
34 /d. 
35 "Invaders" to some. A popular American Indian bumper sticker declares: "Indians had lousy 
immigration laws." jose Piedra, Lauing Columbus, in AMERINDIAN IMAGES AND THE LEGACY OF 
CoLUMBUS 230, 230 (Rene Jara & Nicholas Spadaccini eds., 1992). 
36 See TZVETAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 68 (1992). 
37 See generally FRANK D. REEVE, NAVAJO FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1795-1846 (1983) (describing Navajo 
international law); Wolfgang Preiser, Early Systems of International Law in Middle and South 
America, 18 LAw & ST. 72, 85-86 (1978). 
38 See, e.g., GONZALO A. BELTRAN, FoRMAS DE GOBIERNO INDEGENA (1981); LUCIO MENDIETA Y 
NUNEZ, EL DERECHO PRECOLONIAL (1981). 
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ance and law in the Americas. One, led by Franciscus de Vitoria, held 
that "Indians, having developed their own society, were entitled to their 
own institutions and law. "39 The second stated the feudal position of 
the Spanish monarchy, that there was "one society" and thus one law 
for al1.40 The third approach was that there were "two republics," one 
Spanish and one Indian, in the ArnericasY Aside from the doctrinal 
debates, the "two republics" approach won out as the political and legal 
reality. 
The "two republics" approach required a doctrine of recognition of 
Indian law.42 The general principle, stated in several decrees, was that 
the "good usages and customs of the Indians [must] be observed" to 
the extent they were "not contrary to [the] Christian religion."43 The 
rule of recognition was stated in royal decrees in 1530, 1542, 1555, 
1556, and in the Recopilaci6n de Leyes de Indias of 1680.44 One decree, 
which was enshrined in the Recopilaci6n, a codification of laws pertain-
ing to the Indies and Indians, stated: 
We order and command that the laws and good customs 
which the Indians anciently had for their good government 
and order, and their usages and customs which they have 
observed and kept since they became Christians, and which 
are not incompatible with our holy religion, or with the laws 
of this book, as well as those which they have recently made 
and declared, be kept and executed, and, it being necessary, 
by these presents we approve and confirm them, together 
with what we are able to add thereto that is useful to us and 
appears to us accordant with the service of our Lord God, 
and our own, and the preservation and Christian government 
of the natives of these provinces, without prejudice to what 
has already been done, and their good and just customs and 
their own statutes.45 
:l9 WOODROW BORAH, jUSTICE BY INSURANCE 28 (1983). 
40 !d. This argument is used in industrial societies as well, but it ignores the fact that legal 
pluralism is central to Western law. See BERMAN, supra note 10, at 520-58. 
41 BORAH, supra note 39, at 29; see also McALISTER, supra note 7, at 391-96 (describing the 
ordering of the republics). 
42 See BoRAH, supra note 39, at 29. 
43 !d. at 34. 
44 See id.; Bernal, supra note 33, at 993; see also Beatriz Bernal, Recopilacion de Leyes de Indias, 
in DICCIONARIO jURIDICO MEXICANO, supra note 33, at 2696-99. 
4''Juneau, supra note 22, at 13. The original Spanish states: 
El Emperador Don Carlos y Ia Princesa DoiiaJuana gobernadora en Valladolid, a 6 de 
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Thus, Spanish law established the rule of recognition of the validity 
and legitimacy of Indian law, the rule which prevails in North America 
today. Spanish law instituted other reforms, but it ultimately failed to 
come to grips with the process of legal pluralism and the "two repub-
lics" approach. In 1573, the Crown established the juzgado General de 
Indios (General Court of Indians) in Mexico to deal with disputes 
between Spaniards and Indians.46 The 1513 amendments of the Laws 
of Burgos had provided, in Article IV, that when Indians were "so apt 
and ready to become Christians, and so civilized and educated, that 
they will be capable of governing themselves ... [they] shall be allowed 
to live by themselves .... "47 That provision anticipated self-govern-
ment for Indians, and whether they were Christians or not, Indian 
versions of the Spanish municipality, with judges, the cabeza or cabecera, 
were established.48 The "presiding native figure" was called gobernador 
or juez gobernador, with judicial powers to hold court for minor offenses 
and civil cases.49 
How well did Indian judges adapt to Spanish legal institutions? One 
account assesses their work as follows: 
The cases decided by Indian judges, like those decided by 
corregidores, provide a revealing record of the petty squab-
bles oflndian life-over property, debts, horses, women, mar-
Agosto de 1555. 
Que se guarden las !eyes que los indios tenian antiguamente para su gobierno, y las 
que se hicieren de nuevo. 
Ordenamos y mandamos, que las !eyes y buenas costumbres que antiguamente tenian 
los Indios para su buen gobierno y policia, y sus usos y costumbres observadas y 
guardadas despues que son cristianos, y que no se encuentran con nuestra sagrada 
religion, ni con las !eyes de este libro, y las que han hecho y ordenado de nuevo se 
guarden y ejecuten; y siendo necesario, por Ia presente las aprobamos y confirmamos, 
con tanto que Nos podamos aiiadir lo que fueremos servido, y nos pareciere que 
conviene al servicio de Dios nuestro Senor, y al nuestro, y a Ia conservacion y policia 
christiana de los naturales do aquellas provincias, no perjudicando a lo que tienen 
hecho, ni a las buenas y justas costumbres y estatutos suyos. 
/d. at 13 n.64. There is a slightly different English translation in SPANISH LAWS CoNCERNING 
DISCOVERIES, PACIFICATIONS AND SETTLEMENTS AMONG THE lNIJIANS 50 (S. Lyman Tyler ed., 
1980). 
46 See generally BORAH, supra note 39 (extensive history of the court); CHARLES R. CuTTER, THE 
PROTECTOR DE INDIOS IN CoLONIAL NEW MEXICO 1659-1821 (1986) (experience in Nuevo 
Mexico); SILVIO A. ZAVALA, LAS lNSTITUCIONESjURIDICAS EN LA CONQUISTA DE AMERICA (1971). 
47 LESLEY B. SIMPSON, THE LAws OF BuRGOS OF 1512-1513, at 44-45 (1978). 
48 CHARLES GIBSON, THE AZTECS UNDER SPANISH RULE 33, 167 (1964). An Indian municipality 
in Mexico was called a governadoryotl. /d. 
49 /d. 
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ket goods, and other matters without end. Spaniards occa-
sionally complained that Indian alcaldes possessed only a 
limited understanding of their judicial obligations and that 
they jailed maceguales ["ordinary Indians"] unjustly. On the 
other hand, records of Indian judicial procedure indicate at 
times a remarkable sense of legalism, in absolute imitation of 
Spanish procedures. A number of records of Nahuatl court 
minutes have survived, with accusations, charges, interroga-
tions, depositions, sworn testimonies, sentences, and the full 
corpus of Hispanic legal form. 50 
Ultimately, the Spanish were unable to understand traditional Indian 
law, and used Spanish law in the juzgado General de Indios, despite the 
royal command to guard and execute the laws of Indians. The Spanish 
municipal-judicial form was thus imposed on Indian communities.51 
Throughout the period of Spanish Empire in the Americas, there 
were tensions between the Crown in the enforcement of its humani-
tarian obligations towards the Indians and their nations, and the set-
tlers, who resented special rights and treatments for the Indians. Ulti-
mately, when the nineteenth century period of revolution dawned, 
with "liberal" revolutions to free the Americas from European imperial 
control, the settlers won.52 In Mexico, the solution to the "Indian 
problem" was simple: a Spanish statute of February 9, 1811 decreed 
the judicial equality of Spaniards and Indians, and the Plan of Iguala 
of February 14, 1822 established the same principle, following Mex-
ico's independence.53 Derecho Indiana, the Spanish regime of Indian 
law, died with the revolution, but the hopes and identities of Indian 
peoples persisted.54 
50 !d. at I80. 
51 And it exists to this day among the Pueblos of New Mexico. See JoE S. SANDO, PUEBLO 
NATIONS: EIGHT CENTURIES OF INDIAN HISTORY I3 (I992); WATSON SMITH &joHN M. ROBERTS, 
ZuNI LAw: A FIELD oF VALVES 28-34 (I973); M. Estellie Smith, Pueblo Councils: An Example of 
Stratified Egalitarianism, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN NATIVE NORTH 
AMERICA 32, 36 (Elizabeth Tooker ed., I983); Ada P. Melton, Traditional and Contemporary 
Justice in Pueblo Communities (n.d.) (manuscript on file with authors). 
52 See HARING, supra note 32, at 3I4-25. 
53 See G. Emlen Hall & David]. Weber, Mexican Liberals and the Pueblo Indians, 1821-1829, 59 
N.M. HrsT. REv. I, 5, 7--8 (I984). 
54 The governadoryotl continues to exist in village courts in Mexico, under state law. See generally 
LAURA NADER, jUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (1990). 
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B. The British Rule of Recognition 
Spanish law was built by decree. The English had an administrative 
body akin to the Council of the Indies to fix policy in the Americas, 
called the Privy Council, and they established the office of Commis-
sioner of Indian Mfairs to regulate Indian policy,55 but the rule of 
recognition was established by the English courts. 56 English common 
law is based on judicial decisions, not royal decrees or legislative-ad-
ministrative enactments as it was on the continent. 
The question of the recognition of the law of another people first 
arose in The Case of Tanistry (1608), where the validity of the Irish 
( llrehon) customary law of inheritance was raised.57 The court ruled that 
the indigenous laws of a country survive British rule, if they are rea-
sonable, certain, of immemorial usage and compatible with crown 
sovereignty.58 In Calvin's Case, Lord Coke ruled that the laws of a 
conquered Christian nation survive, but those of an "infidel" nation 
do not. 59 In Omichund v. Barker, the chief justice rejected Coke's view 
as being contrary to scripture, common sense and humanity.60 
The English colonists raised questions of the distinctness of Indians 
as a people for the purposes ofland rights, and many legal writers point 
to The Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut to establish the distinctness, and 
thus the sovereignty, of Indians.61 A member of a royal commission, 
Commissioner Horsman den, "was of the opinion that the Indians were 
a distinct people, that the property of the soil was in the Indians, and 
that royal charters did not ipso facto impropriate lands delimited 
therein to subjects until fair and honest purchases thereof were made 
55 See FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN PoLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 5-25 ( 1962); see 
also BRUCE CLARK, CROWN SOVEREIGNTY: ThE EXISTING ABORIGINAL RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERN-
MENT IN CANADA 66-67 (1990). 
56 The English experimented with native policy in Scotland and Ireland contemporaneously 
with their colonization of America. See generally William C. MacLeod, Celt and Indian: Britain's 
Old World Frontier in Relation to the New, in BEYOND THE FRONTIER: SOCIAL PROGRESS AND 
CuLTURAL CHANGE 25, 24-41 (Paul Bohannan & Fred Plog eds., 1967) (contrasting British and 
Spanish policy). While the British did not cite the Spanish Derecho Indiano, its principles are 
obvious in both British, and later American Indian policy and law. See id. 
57 The Case ofTanistry, 80 Eng. Rep. 516, 520 (K.B. 1608). 
58 /d. The custom did not survive the test. /d. 
59 Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (K.B. 1608). 
60 0michund v. Barker, 125 Eng. Rep. 1310, 1312 (Ch. 1744). 
61 See jOSEPH H. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 
422-42 (1950) (discussing the case, a land arbitration, in full). 
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from the natives. "62 The arbitration decision was affirmed in London 
on January 15, 1773.63 
The question was closed in the 1774 decision by Lord Campbell, 
Campbell v. Hall, which held that the laws of an acquired territory 
remain in force until altered by the Crown.64 This became the rule for 
the British Empire and later the British Commonwealth countries.65 
The English courts established the rule of recognition, and it was 
confirmed in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.66 Thus, the foundation 
was laid for American state practice. 
C. The American Rule of Recognition 
The United States is also a common law jurisdiction. While most 
American Indian affairs law67 is based on Spanish and English colonial 
law,68 a series of American court decisions establish the American rule 
of recognition of the laws of Indians. None of them cite Spanish 
colonial practice, and only a few cite British decisions (particularly 
Campbell v. Hall), but the Spanish and English origins are obvious. 
The first American Indian case, johnson v. M1ntosh, involved the 
question of the legality of purchases from Indians and the application 
of Indian law.69 The Court held that "a person who purchases lands 
from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with 
them, so far as respects the property purchased; holds their title under 
their protection, and subject to their laws. "70 The question of the 
continuing validity and application of Indian criminal law arose in Ex 
Parte Crow Dog, where the Court ruled that customary Indian criminal 
law applies in Indian Country.71 The application of traditional Indian 
62 /d. at 434. 
63 /d. at 442. 
64 Campbell v. Hall, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047-49 (K.B. 1774). 
65 See generally CLARK, supra note 55; PAUL McHUGH, THE MAORI MAGNA CARTA: NEW ZEALAND 
LAW AND THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (1991). 
66 See Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-
State Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REv. 329, 356 (1989). In 1982, 
the English Court of Appeals said that the Proclamation was still good law and is an "Indian Bill 
of Rights." Queen v. Secretary of State, [1982] Q.B. 892, 894 (C.A.), reprinted in ABORIGINAL 
PEOPLES AND THE LAw 150, 155 (Bradford W. Morse ed., 1985). 
67 The official title bestowed by the American Bar Association. 
68 See PRUCHA, supra note 55, at 41-50; Cohen, supra note 30, at 1-2. 
69 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 543-62 (1823). 
70 /d. at 593. 
71 Ex Parte Crowdog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883). "Indian Country" is a term of art, beginning 
with the Royal Proclamation ofl763, which defines Indian lands. It is codified at 18 U .S.C. § 1151. 
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probate law in Indian Country was affirmed in jones v. Meehan in 1899.72 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the authority of Indian nations to 
exclusively regulate domestic relations in 1916 in United States v. Quiver.73 
In more recent years, the United States Supreme Court began ma-
nipulating the rule of recognition. In the 1978 decision of Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe,74 the Court ruled that Indian nations have no 
inherent jurisdictional power over non-Indian offenders within Indian 
Country, citing language from Crow Dog, which said that it would be 
unfair to subject non-Indians to "alien" customary law.75 The decision 
recognized its validity, however. 76 Shortly after Oliphant, the Court 
specifically upheld the authority of the Navajo Nation to apply its 
traditional criminallaw.77 In Duro v. Reina,7R the Court used the same 
reasoning as in Oliphant, i.e., that it would be unfair to apply a law to 
someone who didn't know it, to strip Indian nations of criminal juris-
diction over non-member Indians from other Indian nations. 79 Con-
gress overturned the Court in legislation.Ro 
The American rule of recognition validates the legitimacy of Indian 
nation laws, and particularly traditional laws. It echoes the continuous 
tradition from Roman times, the Sublimis Deus of 1537, and the Span-
ish and English doctrines that Indian law is legitimate, such that Indi-
ans have the right to make and be bound by it. Only recently, the same 
principle has been stated in international law. 
D. The International Rule of Recognition 
As noted, there is a long history to the right of disparate peoples to 
have and enjoy their own law, as there is a history of guaranteeing the 
rights to liberty and property in treaties and other legal documents 
when one state takes over another state or its citizens. The United 
Nations General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights81 (Covenant) in 1966, and it went into force 
72Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I, 29 (1R99). 
73 United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602,606 (1916). 
74 01iphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (l97R). 
75 !d. at 212. 
76 See id. at 211-12. 
77 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (197R). 
78 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
79 See id. at 694-98. 
80 See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994). 
81 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. 
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on March 23, 1976.82 It is a codification of customary international law, 
and Article 27 guarantees the right of persons belonging to ethnic, 
religious and linguistic minorities to "enjoy their own culture. "83 
Among the customary rights which are protected in Article 27 is the 
right to "preservation of customs and legal traditions."84 The official 
U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities report on the Covenant (Capotorti Report) does not 
mention Roman law, Sublimis Deus, or the Spanish, English and Ameri-
can rules outlined above, but it clearly describes the right "to preserve 
the customs and traditions which form an integral part of their way of 
life" as an "element in any system of protection of minorities."85 The 
Capotorti Report indicates that this is a controversial area, and one 
can see echoes of the "one law" and "two republics" conflict within the 
concept that "minorities" have a right to their own law.86 In 1987, the 
U.N. Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Popula-
tions87 (Cabo Report) reiterated the continuing force of customs and 
traditions,88 and recommended measures to assure equality in the 
administration of justice and legal assistance.89 The Cabo Report is 
much weaker than the Capotorti Report.90 Obviously, many national 
governments resist the notion that "minority" groups (which most 
often include indigenous peoples) should have separate legal systems 
or laws.91 
82 PAUL S!EGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (1983). 
83 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 81, art. 27, at 56. 
84 /d. 
85 Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, U.N. ESCOR, 32d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Suh.2/384/Rev.1, at 66 
(1979) [hereinafter Capotorti Report]. 
86 /d. at 66-67. 
87 Jose R. Martinez Coho, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, 
U.N. ESCOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Suh.2/1986/7 I Add.4 (Vol. V, Conclusions, Proposals 
and Recommendations) (1987) [hereinafter Coho Report]. 
88 /d. at 13-14. 
89 /d. at 44-45. 
9° Compare Coho Report, supra note 87, with Capotorti Report, supra note 85. 
91 A review of ratification reservations of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) 
shows a great deal of denial that there even are "minority" groups in some of the ratifYing states. 
See SEIGHART, supra note 82, at 445-66. When the United States ratified the Covenant in 1992, 
the Senate made a reservation, unusual for U.S. international law, that ratification would have 
no effect without implementing legislation (under the Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. 
VI,§ 2, treaties are self-enforcing). See 138 CoNG. REc. S4781-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (ratifica-
tion proceedings). As of 1983, the Bolivia Conference participants that ratified the Covenant are 
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Modern states that resist the Indian rights outlined above are going 
against centuries of fundamental tradition-the human rights tradi-
tion that native peoples have the right to govern themselves through 
law. It is an international customary right which arises from consistent 
European state practice. It is a right which should be dormant no 
longer. 
II. THE "INDIANS HAvE No LAw" MYTH 
The medieval law doctrine regarding the right of "heathens," 
"infidels" and other non-Christians to exercise dominium or legal juris-
diction with their own law was that there was no justification for 
conquest or the imposition of authority over others unless they lived in 
violation of natural law. The usual excuses were idolatry or sexual 
aberrations. Crushing idolatry was one excuse for invasion and con-
quest, and the religious justifications of the conquest of the Indians of 
the Americas are a source of shame for the later European value of 
religious toleration. 
This is not the place to go into the subject in detail, but Columbus 
and his close followers were exceedingly interested in the sexual prac-
tices of lndians.92 Was it that the Europeans were sexually repressed? 
Was it that they found Indians exotic? Or was it that the obsession with 
sexuality we see in the reports of explorers and adventurers was a 
premeditated and precise effort to document Indian sexual practices 
in order to place them in the category of violators of natural law so as 
to justifY invasion? We leave that point to others. 
There was another pretext for invasion and conquest: that Indians 
had "no law." That theme flows throughout the Spanish debates, and 
it persisted into later years. A Dutch visitor to colonial New York, 
Adriaen Van der Donck, noticed "how uncommon" crimes were among 
Hudson River Indians: 'With us, a watchful police is supported, and 
crimes are more frequent than among them."93 
Not recognizing the sanctioning functions performed by 
means that he had himself described, he was baffled to un-
derstand how there could be so little crime "where there is 
Columbia (Oct. 29, 1969), Ecuador (Mar. 6, 1969), Mexico (Mar. 23, 1981), and Peru (Apr. 28, 
1978). See SEIGHART, supra note 82, at 447-49 (table). 
92 See Piedra, supra note 35, at 230. 
93 FRANCis JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, CoLONIALISM AND THE CANT OF 
CONQUEST Ill (1975). 
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no regard paid to the administration of justice." A lawyer 
himself, Van der Danek could recognize due process only 
when it appeared in the forms to which he had been trained. 
That fault was shared by other Europeans contemporary with 
himself and in following generations.94 
Colonel James Smith was held captive by Delaware Indians from 1755 
through 1759, and he wrote about their laws and customs that: "As they 
are illiterate, they consequently have no written code oflaws. What they 
execute as laws, are either old customs, or the immediate result of new 
councils. "95 Smith said that Indians did not have laws and that their 
customs were "very pernicious, and disturb the public weal. "96 
Thomas Jefferson, the American philosopher-scientist-lawyer-politi-
cian, wrote to James Madison on January 30, 1787 to discuss the 
proposed form of United States government and cited three forms, 
including "Without government, as among our Indians. "97 On June 20, 
1803,Jefferson wrote to Captain Meriwether Lewis to give instructions 
about what he was to record on the expedition through the newly-ac-
quired Louisiana Territory and included "peculiarities in their [the 
Indians] laws, customs & dispositions."98 It is curious that a man like 
Jefferson, who was very familiar with Indian life, would articulate the 
"no law" myth yet recognize it when laying the groundwork for the 
"Manifest Destiny" of the United States. 
These are but a few of the "Indians have no laws" conclusions. Were 
the explorers, war captains, captives, visitors and observers simply ig-
norant? Was it that they could not "see" Indian law at work? Or was it 
that they refused to recognize it existed? The many observations of 
Indian society sent back to Europe clearly showed that there was such 
a thing as Indian law and government. The mistake (if there was one) 
94 /d. at 111-12. 
9!\ ARCHIBALD LOUDON, A SELECTION OF SoME OF THE MosT INTERESTING NARRATIVES OF 
OUTRAGES COMMITTED BY THE INDIANS IN THEIR WARS WITH THE WHITE PEOPLE 240 (Arno Press 
1971) (1808). 
96 !d. He did admit that the criminal customs he saw were not as bad, unjust or cruel "as the 
bloody penal laws of England, which we have so long shamefully practised, and which are in force 
in this state [Kentucky], until our penitentiary house is finished, which is now building, and then 
they are to be repealed." !d. at 241. Smith said that perhaps Indian law had some advantages: 
"They are not oppressed or perplexed with expensive litigation-They are not injured by legal 
robbery-They have no splendid villains that make themselves grand and great upon other 
peoples labor-They have neither church or state erected as money-making machines." !d. 
97 THE PORTABLE THOMAS jEFFERSON 415,416 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
98 !d. at 308, 310. 
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arose from a legal heresy used to excuse the imposition of alien law 
and government on Indian nations. 
Surely, Indian law is different. There are language barriers to know-
ing it. It is expressed in different ways. However, there is such a thing 
as the legal tradition of Indian law, as there is with the Roman law, 
continental law and English common law traditions. This too is part of 
the consideration policy-makers must take of the right of Indians to 
enjoy their own law. 
III. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
There are important policy reasons to reserve comparing Indian law 
with A.D.R. While the reference to this term in Article 171 of the 
Bolivian Constitution (1994 amendment) 99 is an important step for-
ward, there are dangers in the use of the term. To Indians, their legal 
traditions are the first or original methods of dispute resolution. 100 
They are only an "alternative" to the state system oflaw. It is dangerous 
to compare A.D.R. with traditional Indian law, because the errors in 
doing so have destructive impacts. 101 
American Indians have experience with A.D.R. As the movement 
developed in the United States: 
Nothing, it seemed, propelled enthusiasm for alternative dis-
pute resolution like a few legal victories that unsettled an 
equilibrium of privilege. Once native Americans litigated to 
retain tribal lands seized in violation of treaty rights, the 
federal Bureau of Indian Affairs proclaimed the value of 
informality. And in Alaska, conciliation proposals were de-
signed to integrate Eskimo tribal justice into the state legal 
process. There was an especially diabolical quality to prescrip-
tions of informal dispute settlement for native Americans 
who, for centuries, had practiced their own indigenous tribal 
99 BoL. CaNST. art. 171; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
100 The Hon. Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REv. 175, 
175 (1994). 
101 For example, Robert C. Depew prepared a report for the Aboriginal Justice Directorate, 
Department of justice Canada, which uses shortcomings in the Canadian-American A.D.R. move-
ment to urge denial or slow implementation of native justice initiatives in Canada. ROBERT C. 
DEPEW, PoPULAR jusTICE AND ABORIGINAL CoMMUNITIES: SoME PRELIMINARY CoNSIDERATIONS 
(Dec. 1994) (on file with authors). He used A.D.R. deficiencies as a straw man, and any resulting 
position of the Department of justice Canada to resist native rights is false. See id. 
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forms of dispute settlement-until white intruders imposed 
the norms of legal adjudication. 102 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs forced Indian nations into A.D.R. to 
resolve their land and resource claims and "the shifting political cur-
rents of legality and informality, applied to native Americans, simulta-
neously reduced their tribal cohesion and diminished their legal 
rights. "103 
There is a difference between informal procedures in a forum where 
Indian groups must assert their rights against non-Indians and tradi-
tional Indian dispute resolution. In Indian-White relationships there 
are imbalances in bargaining position, with resulting disparities in 
outcomes. Adjudication was imposed on the Indians of the Americas 
when European judicial systems were established because the newcom-
ers could not (or would not) understand Indian legal procedure. That 
must not be done again. 
A few years ago, some A.D.R. experts from New Mexico visited the 
Navajo Nation to get a view of the traditional Navajo procedures util-
ized in the Navajo Peacemaker Court. 104 They sincerely offered to teach 
A.D.R. methods to the Navajos they visited, but their hosts politely 
declined, because they had already had adjudication imposed on them, 
which was unsuccessful. The Navajo hosts (including Philmer Blue-
house, head of the Peacemaker Division, or Hozhooji Naat'aaniz) of-
fered to teach Navajo methods to the visitors, and some of them 
returned to complete the Judicial Branch (of the Navajo Nation) 
in-house certification training for peacemakers. 
There are vast differences between A.D.R. and the traditional meth-
ods of many Indian nations, and that must be kept in mind when 
considering "alternative dispute resolution" for Indians. There are 
dangers in transplanting the methods of one culture into another.105 
Indian systems may be an alternative to the state system, but they are 
more often unique in themselves. 
102jEROLD S. AUERBACH, jUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 128 
(1983). 
103 ld. at 129. 
104 See, e.g., James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Accommodation 
to the New, 11 AMER. INDIAN L. REv. 89 (1983). 
105 However, the American experience with tribal courts shows that if Indian nations are left 
free to develop their own systems, based on English-American models, they work. The Pueblos 
of New Mexico and village courts of Mexico use the Spanish model with success. 
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IV. SuMMARY OvERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL INDIAN JusTicE 
There are hundreds-if not thousands-of Indian groups in the 
Americas. There are many different language families. There are dia-
lects and customs which may vary greatly, particularly in mountain and 
jungle areas where peoples are isolated. Therefore, it is impossible to 
state general principles about Indian law with accuracy. There are some 
things, however, which are most likely universal or nearly so. 106 
There are several important approaches to law. European traditions 
are most often built on articulations of rules by legislatures, executives 
or courts. There are alternative views, such as the one that "law" is 
process, not rules. 107 
Think of law as norms which are enforced by institutions. 108 A 
"norm" "is a rule, more or less overt, which expresses 'ought' aspects 
of relationships between human beings. "109 It can also be a value or a 
moral principle. Values are shared feelings about good ways in life or 
what conduct should be avoided. A "moral principle" is a fundamental 
value which people follow, depending upon the strength of shared 
values in a given community. A "custom" is a body of norms which are 
followed in practice. 110 Principles of law are created by agents of society 
which may be separate and independent of institutions governed by 
customs. 111 When a legal institution articulates a norm or validates a 
custom, that is "law."112 Force is not necessary to have law; law is "that 
which has been reinstitutionalized within the legal institution so that society 
can continue to function in an orderly manner on the basis of rules so 
maintained. "113 
106 In July, 1983, a group of Indian justice leaders from nations which ranged from the Rio 
Grande River (between Mexico and the U.S.) of the United States to North Saskatchewan in 
Canada met at the Blackfeet Nation to discuss Indian customary law. The participants found that 
many customs and approaches are the same. James W. Zion surveyed Indian customary law in 
Saskatchewan in 1984, and also found many common bonds. 
I07 See, e.g., SALLY F. MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH ( 1978). 
108 See Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, in LAw AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONFLICT 44-45 (Paul Bohannan ed., 1967) (theory of "double institution-
alization"). 
109 Id. at 45. 
rw Id. 
111 Id. This conclusion assumes that those who make the law may be different from those who 
make up the institutions governed by custom. !d. That is, Indians who follow custom are also the 
lawmakers. Bohannan, supra note 108, at 45. Aquinas said law can be made by the "whole people," 
and that is true of custom. See AQUINAS, supra note 14, at 8. 
112 See Bohannan, supra note 108, at 46-50. 
li3Jd. at 48 (emphasis in original). 
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The element of institutions, which define and apply norms, is im-
portant. In most American jurisdictions, there are legislatures, execu-
tives, courts or agencies which engage in the process of double insti-
tutionalization. They identify the norms they feel are valuable, in the 
ways that they perceive them, and choose various alternatives to impose 
and enforce them. 114 One key to knowing Indian law is to understand 
Indian institutions and how they function. 
European law is essentially a "vertical" system which is built on 
hierarchies of power. 115 It maintains police, lawyers, courts and prisons. 
Those institutions are staffed by the elite, for the most part. Depending 
upon the mobility of the general population to get into the professions 
which control legal institutions, they will be operated by only the few. 116 
The state systems most often do not have Indians perform double-in-
stitutionalization, i.e. make the laws, because there are few opportuni-
ties for them to obtain the education or opportunities to join the 
elite.117 
In contrast, Indian traditional legal systems are "horizontal. "118 In-
dian clan and kinship groups are legal systems. 119 Vertical systems use 
hierarchies of power and authority, backed by force and coercion, to 
operate their legal systems. Horizontal systems are essentially egalitar-
ian and function using relationships. Many reject force or coercion.120 
114 The disparity between the legal institution's perceptions of what is "right" and the percep-
tions of those subject to the law is obvious. In the United States, there are those who question 
the method of selecting members of Congress for that very reason. National economic policy also 
often conflicts with the rights of Indians. 
115 Yazzie, supra note 100, at 177 (citing MICHAEL BARKUN, LAw WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER 
IN PRIMATIVE SOCIETIES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 16-17 (1968) ). Interestingly, Carlos Fuen-
tes frequently uses the term "vertical" to describe Spanish institutions in the Americas. See 
FuENTES, supra note 11, at 129-37. 
116 See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, LAw AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
PREINDUSTRIAL SociETIES 238-42 (1983) (analysis of legal institutions by social stratification, 
wealth distinctions and class stratification). The typology or different kinds of legal institutions 
are: (l) self- or kin-based redress, (2) advisor systems, (3) mediator systems, ( 4) elders' and 
restricted councils, (5) chieftainships, (6) paramount chieftainships, and (7) state-level legal 
systems. See id. at 51-98. 
117 The Cobo Report contains recommendations on how to involve indigenous populations in 
legal systems. The report's approach is limited, and states should recognize or implement self-
government, self-determination and sovereignty models in partnership with indigenous peoples, 
i.e. the Spanish "two republics" concept. See Cobo Report, supra note 87, at 21, 44. 
118 See Yazzie, supra note 100, at 180. 
119 See id. at 182-83. Given that kinship groups are legal institutions, policy makers should 
understand their makeup and functioning. See HAROLD E. DRIVER, INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 
242-68 (1969). 
120 In 1994, a lawyer from Vienna, Austria visited the Courts of the Navajo Nation. He insisted 
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The European mind has a difficult time understanding Indian legal 
procedure because the legal institutions of Europe, and those im-
ported to the Americas, are a product of concentrations of royal power, 
nationalism and central government. "Tyranny is an abuse of hierar-
chy,"121 so legal systems which are based on authority tend to become 
authoritarian. European legal systems need complex human rights and 
civil rights doctrines and institutions to temper abuses of authority and 
hierarchy. Traditional Indian legal systems were, in large part (and with 
notable exceptions), founded on equality and reciprocal relationships. 
We must understand this distinction because it goes to the heart of 
legal policy development with indigenous populations and their free-
dom to do things in their own ways. 
Traditional Indian law and modern forms of Indian law in operation 
today respond to unique relationships. Indian societies have their own 
legal institutions, both original as well as those developed in response 
to contact, which utilize mass double-institutionalization in custom, or 
articulated rules of law by legal bodies. The norms, values and moral 
principles which are applied as law are derived from the languages, 
religions, relationships and societies that Indians retain. 122 They are 
what make Indian peoples unique. 
v. NAVAJ0123 LEGAL THINKING AND INSTITUTIONS 
The Navajo Nation of Arizona, New Mexico and Utah is the largest 
Indian nation in North America. As of 1993, it had a total population 
of 155,276 persons.124 There are 17,627,262.80 acres of land in the 
Navajo Nation,125 which makes it larger than Ireland and almost the 
size of the state of South Carolina, which is the 40th U.S. state in size. 
Dine Bikeyah (Navajoland) is larger than New England and nine U.S. 
states. 
that traditional Navajo law must have employed various exotic punishments, and he refused to 
accept that most Navajo legal procedures use consensus for outcomes. In 1982, Chief Justice 
Yazzie made a presentation on Navajo common law to western state judges, and one remarked 
that Yazzie left out how Navajos staked people to ant hills. That was not a Navajo legal procedure. 
121 SAGAN, supra note 6, at 277. 
122 See Yazzie, supra note 100, at 1-2. 
123 There are several different methods of spelling Navajo; the Spanish spelling is the preferred 
spelling. 
124 DuANE ETSITTY, NN [NAVAJO NATION] FAx 93, at 4 (1994) (on file with authors). Of that 
population, 6923 persons were non-Indian. !d. 
125 !d. at 49. 
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Navajo norms, values and moral principles are stated in the Navajo 
language and preserved in Navajo creation scripture, origin stories, 
ceremonies, songs, stories and maxims. The Navajo creation scripture 
relates the journey narratives which led the people to their current 
homeland.126 Navajo social stories about mythic creatures, particularly 
Coyote and Horned Toad, are another means to record values as legal 
principles. 127 Songs are also used as legal teaching tools.128 
The Navajo language is very sophisticated. Many Navajo words and 
phrases express concepts which are difficult to render in another 
language. They are descriptive and provide vivid word pictures. Navajos 
do not use religious or sexual swearing, but one phrase which is used, 
shash kheyadae, means "from the bear's den!"129 The Navajo word for a 
lawyer, 'agha'diit'aahii, means "someone who pushes out with words." 
It describes someone who is bossy, not a very nice person in Navajo 
thinking. 
There are several Navajo maxims to urge good action or describe 
bad acts: in the marriage ceremony, the couple is urged, hazho' sokee'-
"stay together nicely." An elder who speaks to a child will say, hozhigo-
"do things in a good way." Of a wrongdoer, Navajos will say, "He acts 
as if he had no relatives" (showing the importance of social controls).130 
The word k 'e is important in Navajo relationships; it is what makes 
the Navajo legal institutions of the clan and civil leader work.131 It is 
very difficult to translate this word into another language because it 
has deep connotations in order to urge persons to go along with the 
group. 132 It is an aggregation of deep feelings which urge respect and 
solidarity with the group.133 The word speaks to reciprocal relationships 
126 See, e.g., WASHINGTON MATTHEWS, NAVAJO LEGENDS (1994); PAUL G. ZOLBROD, DINE BA-
HANE': THE NAVAJO CREATION STORY (1984) (examples of collections of the creation scripture 
in English). Navajos frequently cite the scripture in daily discussions of problems or disputes. The 
Navajo Nation Navajo Law Project is currently reviewing them for use in the courts. 
127 See, e.g., FATHER BERARD HAILE, O.F.M., NAVAJO CoYOTE TALES (1984). Father Haile's work 
is superior because it uses facing page Navajo-English translations. For an example of a story of 
Horned Toad (a law giver), see Philmer Bluehouse &James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat'aanii: The 
Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1993, at 327, 333. Navajo judges 
insist that children should learn the Coyote stories (told in winter) so they will know the law. 
128 See, e.g., JOHN R. FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK: A SYNTHESIS OF NAVAJO PHILOSOPHY (1984) 
(analysis of the values conveyed by songs). 
129 THE FRANCISCAN FATHERS, AN ETHNOLOGIC DICTIONARY OF THE NAVAHO LANGUAGE 444 
(1910). 
130 Raymond D. Austin, ADR and the Navajo Peacemaker Court, JuDGES']., Spring 1993, at 8, 10. 
131 See Yazzie, supra note 100, at 182. 
132Jd. 
133 !d. 
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where there are duties and obligations to both the individual and the 
group. 134 The maxim which expresses Navajo individuality and freedom 
is, "It's up to him." Navajos believe in a greater degree offreedom than 
the Western concept of individuality, but individuality is still exercised 
in the context of the well-being of the group. 
There is a special kind of k 'e called k 'ei or clan ship. Navajos are 
matrilineal. They are "born of' their mother's clan and "born for" their 
father's clan. Thus, they trace relationships beyond blood ties or im-
mediate biological family. The clan is the Navajo legal institution. 
Navajos had both war leaders and civil leaders. Traditional civil 
leaders are selected by group consensus and they have authority only 
for as long as they benefit the group.ns The Navajo civil leader's 
authority is not coercive, but persuasive. 136 That is, he or she compels 
others through urging and example, not through power and force. 
The Navajo leader is not merely an "advisor" or a "mediator," however, 
nor a "chief' in the sense of someone who can command another. 
A traditional civil leader is a planner. The Navajo concept of civil 
leadership authorizes justice planners for the traditional Navajo legal 
institution. A justice planner is a naat'aanii. 137 The word itself describes 
a person who speaks wisely and well. 138 Wisdom comes from experience 
and knowledge of the ceremonies, and speech is valued as a virtue. 
The Navajo language tends to be very precise, so words are important. 
A traditional story about one naat'aanii says that he was "able to talk 
the goods in." This phrase refers to the talent for planning the leader 
had, and how his wisdom was used for community success. Navajo 
planning, naat 'aah, is very pragmatic and a plan is the product of 
considering every aspect of a problem through talking it out in a group 
setting. 
What happens when there is a dispute? The person who claims 
injury demands nalyeeh. The word is translated as "restitution" or 
"reparation," but it is an action word which demands compensation 
for an injury and an adjustment of relationships between an "offender" 
and a "victim."139 Who is the judge? It is not a naat'aanii, but the 
persons who are involved in the dispute. 140 The persons who have 
1~4 !d. 
135 !d. 
136Yazzie, supra note 100, at 182. 
137 See id. at 186. 
138 !d. 
139 See Austin, supra note 130, at 10. 
140 Yazzie, supra note 100, at 186-87. 
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"standing" by being within the "zone of dispute" in Navajo common 
law include relatives and clan members of the parties. The procedure 
used to resolve the dispute is "talking things out," and the Navajo word 
for "trial," 'ahwiniti, means ''where they talk about you."141 
How does the "trial" work? The person who demands nalyeeh seeks 
the assistance of a relative to get a naat'aanii to summon the partici-
pants to talk things out. The particular naat'aanii will often be a blood 
or clan relative because horizontal legal institutions operate within 
relationship groups. The session always opens with a prayer, and it is 
often held after a meal. Prayer is a means of summoning supernatural 
assistance. It focuses the minds of the participants on the purposes of 
the gathering. Prayer is a powerful and compulsive word. 142 It brings 
in the supernaturals, not simply as witnesses (as with the European 
oath) but as participants and agents for action. 
Following the prayer, each person in the group has an opportunity 
to speak. The opinions and feelings of both the "victim" and the 
"perpetrator" are important, as are those of their relatives. For exam-
ple, in a talking out session held to discuss the paternity of a child, the 
child's grandparents resolved the putative father's denial of paternity 
by pointing out that they (as the parents of the couple) knew about 
the sexual relationship all along and there was no doubt the child was 
theirs. 
Mter such discussions take place, the naat'aanii expresses an opin-
ion about the dispute in "the lecture." This translation in English is 
unfortunate because what the naat'aanii says is not simply a lecture on 
abstract moral principles. It often relates to Navajo creation scripture 
through its many examples and maxims of the right way to do things. 143 
A Navajo naat'aanii is not a "neutral," as with American A.D.R. media-
tion, because he or she is summoned to guide the parties, not as a 
decision-maker, but as a guide or teacher. The naat 'aanii 's opinion 
about the right way of doing things is important to the parties. The 
"lecture" or opinion is also important for the process of naat'aah or 
planning. 
141 Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions, and Fairness in the Navajo Nation Code of judicial 
Conduct, 76JUDICATURE 15, 17 (1992) (describing the utilization of Navajo legal principles in an 
ethics code for judges and court personnel). Tom Tso is a former Chief Justice of the Navajo 
Nation Supreme Court. 
142 See generally GLADYS A. REICHARD, PRAYER: THE COMPULSIVE WoRD (1944). 
143 Co-author James W. Zion, a non-Indian, was divorced from his Navajo wife in a "talking out" 
session where a naat'aanii gave the lecture about harmonious relationships and ending the 
marriage "in the good way," using the creation scripture on marriage. 
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The first step of making a plan is to carefully identifY the problem. 
The Navajo word for it is nayee, which literally translated means "mon-
ster." A "monster" is something which gets in the way of life, a barrier, 
an impediment, or an obstacle to be overcome.144 In Navajo creation, 
there were monsters who walked the earth, and the Hero Twins who 
slayed them went through a long process oflearning, preparation, trial 
and seeking assistance to be able to slay them. The naat'aanii helps 
the parties identifY the causes of trouble and uses Nav.Yo wisdom and 
experience in the lecture to guide them. The parties then develop a 
plan of action to end the dispute through consensus and agreement. 
That plan describes the duties of each participant to mend relation-
ships. 
The end goal and the result is hozho nahasdlii, which is the new 
relationship and attitude of the parties. It is the product of the process. 
It means, "now that we have done this, we are again in a state of hozho." 
The term hozho nahasdlii is used to conclude a prayer. Unlike the 
European prayer-termination word, amen, it does not mean "may it be 
so." It means "It is so." Although hozho is very difficult to translate, it 
refers to the wholeness of all reality and the connections of everyone 
and everything.145 It involves the supernaturals, who are actually pre-
sent to be a part of the process. It uses values of k 'e solidarity and 
respect to reach a conclusion or state of being among everyone where 
each one interrelates in a proper way with the others. 
A final decision often involves a transfer of goods to the injured 
person, to compensate for actual injury and to serve as a symbol of a 
good relationship. The amount or value of the compensation can 
include "a little extra" to show the seriousness of the act or injury. An 
agreement to deliver goods (such as jewelry, sheep, horses or money) 
also has the effect of showing the innocence of the victim, as with the 
open and visible delivery of horses to compensate for a rape, or a 
husband's act of giving nalyeeh to a wife to make up for an assault. 146 
Relatives are an important part of the final agreement or ·~udg­
ment." The relatives of someone who has injured another are respon-
sible to help pay nalyeeh or help the parties with the immediate dispute. 
They are "traditional probation officers" in the sense that if they pay 
144 Austin, supra note 130, at 10. 
145 Jd. 
146 See james W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion, Hazho' Sokee': Stay Together Nicely: Domestic Violence Under 
Navajo Common Law, 25 ARiz. ST. LJ. 407, 413-22 (1993). 
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valuable goods to a victim and that person's family, they will "keep an 
eye on" the offender to prevent future misconduct. 
These are only a few of the legal principles and procedures used in 
traditional Navajo dispute resolution. They work, because Navajos 
value relationships and respect the traditions which are expressed in 
the Navajo language and religion. Navajo justice is egalitarian, consen-
sual and builds on the interdependence of people in clans and fami-
lies.147 Traditional Navajo law had no need for civil rights or constitu-
tional protections, because the Navajos did not need protection from 
authority figures in vertical institutions. There are those who protest 
that this is all very fine in a traditional society where people spoke the 
same language and lived in homogeneous communities, but it cannot 
work in a modern industrialized state where there are people from 
different backgrounds. Is that so? 
In 1992, the Navajo Nation judges decided to consciously reinstitu-
tionalize the traditional Navajo legal procedure in the formal court 
system.148 They called it the "Navajo Peacemaker Court. "149 It operates 
on two levels: the rules of the court division essentially provide for 
court-annexed "mediation" and "arbitration,"150 but the traditional 
processes described above are generally used. At present, there are 
over 250 peacemakers in the 110 chapters or local governmental units 
of the Navajo Nation. How does the modern version of traditional 
justice work in practice? Given that modern Navajos live in towns, 
watch television and function in a wage and consumer economy, is 
traditional justice a dead letter? Are peacemaking methods limited to 
the remaining pockets of rural, Navajo-speaking peoples or do they 
work in a modern society? 
Navajo thought is very practical and pragmatic. Navajo legal proce-
dure in peacemaking is not only a process to achieve a group decision, 
but also to solve problems. It gets at the heart of the matter and 
educates people to guide them to adjust their relationships. 
We can describe Navajo justice methods in light of modern psychol-
ogy. Most Navajo Nation crime involves alcohol-related misconduct 
directed against family members and relatives. Many civil actions in-
147 See generally, Yazzie, supra note 100. 
148 !d. at 186. 
149 See Zion, supra note 104, at 89-90. 
150 Peacemaking is not really "mediation," because a naat'aanii peacemaker is not a "neutral" 
as in American A.D.R. It is not "arbitration," because a naat'aanii does not make a decision for 
others. In the Navajo system, the parties can agree to have a peacemaker make the decision. 
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valve n~uries or failed promises within relationships. 151 In Western 
legal systems, where punishment or property-shifting is central, there 
is great emphasis on accusations. The individual human response to 
an accusation often is a state of denial, minimalization, or externaliza-
tion. Denial is where someone refuses to admit he or she has a problem 
or caused harm to another. On any given Monday morning in courts 
around the United States, persons accused of drunk-driving refuse to 
admit they have a problem. Minimalization is a situation where some-
one excuses an action by saying it is not a big deal. We hear that it is 
"okay" for a man to beat his wife, or that it is "traditional" for a Navajo 
husband to beat his wife (although it is against Navajo traditions to do 
so) .152 Externalization is blaming. Men often blame the woman in 
domestic violence situations to excuse motivation. They also claim that 
they were drunk. That is an excuse, and too often courts have allowed 
"time out" for drunken behavior. 
Navajo peacemaking addresses denial, minimalization and externali-
zation in ways that state systems cannot do. In a given state system, 
proving the facts of a case is difficult and burdensome. In criminal 
systems with the privilege against self-incrimination, defendants cannot 
be compelled to discuss motives, attitudes, addictions or causes of 
misconduct. In Navajo peacemaking, which does not utilize punish-
ment, people are free to "talk out" the problem fully and get at the 
psychological barriers which impede a practical solution. How does it 
do that? 
The Navajo Nation courts received funding through the U.S. Depart-
ment of justice to implement the Male Minority Project. It is a diversion 
program whereby persons accused of drunk driving are sent into 
peacemaking. They have "use immunity" for anything they say, 153 and 
thus they are free to talk. If the defendant claims not to have a drinking 
problem, he or she says it to a spouse, parents, children and others 
who know the person well. If the defendant claims about wife-beating 
that it is not a big deal or that the wife is at fault, he must say it to his 
spouse or her family members. An individual's values are clarified and 
corrected by those who know him well and know the true facts, rein-
I.ol Traditional Navajo law. or Navajo common law, did not distinguish between criminal and 
civil actions. 
152 Navajo judges also hear it is "traditional" to have sexual relations with a step-child or a child 
who has barely reached the age of puberty. These are stereotypes which are picked up from 
outsider's assumptions about Indians. 
153 "Use immunity" means that nothing which is said in peacemaking can be used against a 
defendant if the case returns to court for adjudication and punishment. 
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forced by a naat'aanii who is also there to correct unrealistic attitudes. 
In one domestic violence case, a wife-beater attempted to deny and 
excuse his actions, and his sister immediately corrected him. She told 
him that he was an abuser with an alcohol problem, and she offered 
her assistance to help him and his wife lead a new life to avoid abuse. 
Navajo peacemaking addresses other psychological problems. It is a 
form of counseling. The Honorable Irene Toledo, judge of the Navajo 
Nation Ramah Judicial District, wondered about the existence of "post-
traumatic stress disorder" among defendants accused of assault. Nava-
jos enlist in the U.S. military forces at rates far higher than the general 
population and fought in both Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm. 
On closer examination, Judge Toledo found there was a correlation 
between the disorder and violence, including violence by the children 
of veterans. 154 Navajos are well aware of this disorder, and for centuries 
have conducted a special healing ceremony for returning war veterans 
which deals with the horrors of war and the traumatic memories wars 
cause. Judge Toledo used peacemaking counseling to urge offenders 
to get their healing ceremony, and the process worked. Peacemaking 
is also used to prepare defendants to voluntarily enter Western-styled 
treatment programs. 
Navajo justice methods are practical. They use methods which are 
not mysterious or unique to Navajos, but which address recognized 
human emotions. They build on human processes which are universal. 
Indian justice recognizes human relationships and reinforces them to 
reach practical conclusions. 
In 1994, visitors from the Parliament of Namibia visited the Navajo 
Nation. As Chief Justice Yazzie explained Navajo justice concepts, the 
group's tour guide protested that what Yazzie said was all very fine for 
a traditional society which was homogeneous and where everyone 
spoke the same language, but it wouldn't work for people with cultural 
or language differences. The chief justice smiled and related a story. 
A young Navajo child was pushed into a clothes dryer and was scorched 
to death. The child's parents brought a wrongful death suit against the 
laundromat and a products liability action against the manufacturing 
company for negligence in manufacturing the dryer. The defense 
attorney examined a likely jury verdict in court adjudication and saw 
that it was impossible to predict an outcome. The potential cost of both 
154 Violence is learned behavior. See Jeffrey A. Roth, Psychoactive Substances and Violence, NA-
TIONAL lNST!TUn: OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 
1994; Cathy S. Widom, The Cycle of Violence, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF 
(U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1992. 
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litigation and a judgment could have been prohibitive. The defense 
attorney asked for peacemaking. In a session involving the child's 
parents and representatives of the laundromat and the manufacturer, 
the parties "talked out" the child's death. The parents related that they 
were not motivated by money, but simply wanted a means of dealing 
with the loss of their child. The lawyers waited in the hallway. At the 
end of the peacemaking session, the parties agreed to a settlement 
sum. The amount was about what the defendants could have expected 
from a rural jury in the Arizona court system. 
VI. "BAcK To THE FuTURE" 
Associate Justice Raymond D. Austin of the Navajo Nation Supreme 
Court describes well how many Indian nations are applying their tra-
ditional law-they are going "back to the future."155 Austin concludes 
that the Indians did well until Columbus arrived, but everything went 
down hill after that. Now that Indians are consciously reviving their 
traditional justice methods and ways of doing things, they will recover. 
He adds that the Western world has much to learn from traditional 
Indian justice methods. 156 
Indian customary justice works. Navajo justice is a corrective, restora-
tive and distributive justice. It is "corrective" in that it seeks the source 
of problems and develops practical plans to deal with both the cause 
and the act which create a dispute. It is "restorative" in that it deals 
with and adjusts the relationships of parties. It is "distributive" in that 
a great deal of Navajo legal thought revolves around group responsi-
bilities to people in need, and giving people the material or emotional 
support they need to resolve an injury or deal with a personal problem. 
It is practical and the ends of justice are geared to the needs and 
relationships of people. 
What is the present situation in North America? In the United States, 
the tribal court system prevails. Tribal courts are justice bodies created 
by the inherent powers of Indian nations. They are most often based 
on the American justice court model, but when outsiders observe 
them, they think that the Indians are getting it wrong. This is because 
the outsiders do not know what they are looking at, and still believe 
the "Indians have no law" myth. In Canada, Indians are deprived of 
the right to have and use their own law, but the Canadian Government 
now knows this does not work. In Canada, there are many discussions 
155 Austin, supra note 130, at 48. 
156 See id. at 8. 
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of integrating Indian methods into the state system or, better yet, 
recognizing indigenous justice bodies. In Mexico, there may be adap-
tations in village courts or assemblies which could be a beginning for 
the revival of traditional Indian law. 
What do Navajos have that they can teach to American lawyers? In 
a word, trust. In the United States, non-Indians who do not understand 
Indian justice attempt to assert control in "model codes," imposed laws 
and judicial review. They cannot understand that most traditional 
Indian justice does not revolve around punishment, but focuses on 
problem-solving and relationships. In the Navajo system, the judges 
(who are law-trained Navajos but not necessarily law school graduates) 
are learning that peacemaking works very well when they leave com-
munity-based peacemakers alone. The Navajo rules for the process do 
not mention or regulate traditional methods but leave them free to 
operate on their own. 
Indians are fully capable of resolving their own problems, in their 
own ways and in their own communities. They do not fare well in state 
systems, and it is likely that a state system will never fully and fairly 
accommodate Indian perceptions of justice. "Do you handle murder 
in peacemaking?" is a question we often hear. Yes, peacemaking does 
address claims for nalyeeh in murder cases, but the Navajo Nation wants 
a better partnership with the United States Government to deal with 
it in the federal system. Navajos want the resources to deal with murder 
cases through the option of prisons, where needed. 
Indian justice is 'justice" for Indians when the state cannot or will 
not respond in its systems of adjudication. Indian peoples have a right 
to make their own law and apply it in their own institutions in a way 
which suits them. They have had that right since Roman times; it is a 
fundamental human right. Indians have a choice. They can use state-
model adjudication, an adapted method (such as tribal courts or the 
Spanish institutions found in New Mexico and elsewhere), or tradi-
tional methods. They can develop or adapt others. 
The action word is "trust," and the method is partnership. Never 
again should a legal system be imposed on Indian nations, such as was 
done with adjudication in tribal courts. A.D.R. methods should be 
developed in communities, not in universities, or departments of jus-
tice or Indian affairs. "Legal pluralism" means different methods of 
justice which work side-by-side and function well because they have a 
good relationship. In other words, they will work well if they have k 'e 
and hozho. That is what Navajos continue to do in the wake of conquest, 
so they will never really be conquered. 
